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Drug Firms, the Codification of Diagnostic Categories, and Bias in Clinical Guidelines  
Lisa Cosgrove and Emily E. Wheeler  
 
Introduction 
The profession of medicine is predicated upon an ethical mandate: first do no harm. However, 
critics charge that the medical profession’s culture and its public health mission are being 
undermined by the pharmaceutical industry’s wide-ranging influence. In this article, we analyze 
how drug firms influence psychiatric taxonomy and treatment guidelines such that these 
resources may serve commercial rather than public health interests.  Moving beyond a conflict-
of-interest model, we use the conceptual and normative framework of institutional corruption to 
examine how organized psychiatry’s dependence on drug firms has distorted science.  We 
suggest that academic-industry relationships have led to the corruption of the evidence base upon 
which accurate diagnosis and sound treatment depend.  We describe the current dependency 
corruption and argue that transparency alone is not a solution—and sometimes even produces 
iatrogenic effects.  Furthermore, we argue that the corruption of the evidence base for diagnostic 
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and practice guidelines renders obsolete the traditional informed consent process, and we offer 
suggestions for reforming this process. 
 
Corruption of Diagnostic Guidelines 
When the American Psychiatric Association (APA) published the first edition of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) in 1952, there were no antianxiety agents, 
antidepressants, or antipsychotics on the market, and psychiatry embraced a psychoanalytic 
model. Outside of psychoanalytic circles, DSM diagnoses (of which there were few) had little 
professional and no cultural currency. But the manual that few had ever heard of in 1952 is now 
frequently referred to as the “bible” of psychiatric disorders and the most current edition, DSM-5, 
is integral in sustaining the multibillion-dollar psychopharmacology market. Indeed, the DSM, 
through its increasing congruence with the International Classification of Diseases—the 
classification system used by most countries—affects health care globally.  
Because the DSM standardizes symptom criteria and codifies psychiatric disorders, it 
plays a central role in health and disability claims, insurance coverage, and court cases such as 
custody disputes and cases involving defense on the grounds of mental illness. Although the use 
of the DSM among all clinicians addressing mental health concerns, not just psychiatrists, makes 
it an important source of revenue for the APA, accounting for 46 percent of its 2011 revenue 
from publications,
1
 the DSM also has a profound monetary impact that extends well beyond 
sales, due to its effect on many diverse domains.  
 For example, the DSM plays an important role in the approval process for new drugs and 
in the regulatory process for extending patents of previously approved medications. The U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires an identifiable psychiatric condition before it will 
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consider granting approval of an application for a new psychotropic medication, thereby creating 
an “economy of influence”2 among authors of diagnostic and treatment guidelines, drug 
regulators, and drug manufacturers. In fact, some critics have referred to the relationship 
amongst the DSM, the FDA, and Big Pharma as an “unholy alliance.” Thus, it is not surprising 
that, shortly after the task force for the DSM-5 was established in 2007, critics charged that 
corporate interests, particularly those of the pharmaceutical industry, might be influencing the 
DSM revision process.  
Concerns about industry influence and, concomitantly, the exponential rise in 
prescriptions for psychotropic medications stem from the fact that, with each revision of the 
DSM, the APA has increased the number of diagnostic categories. The first DSM identified 106 
disorders, but by the time the DSM-IV Text Revision was published in 2000, the number had 
almost tripled. Also, the DSM-III marked a paradigm shift in the conceptualization of psychiatric 
diagnosis, a shift that turned out to be fortuitous for drug firms. Robert Spitzer, who chaired the 
DSM-III, was committed to replacing the “pseudo-scientific” framework of earlier editions with 
an emphasis on empirical validity and reliability. He wanted to develop a psychiatric nosology 
that was reliable, valid, and disease-oriented rather than merely descriptive. The DSM adopted 
the biopsychosocial model, which explicitly links the biological and psychological. Spitzer also 
removed references to psychoanalytic theory, such as the term “neurosis,” and instead included 
specific symptom and threshold criteria in an explicit attempt to increase diagnostic reliability.
3
 
The emphasis on verifiable symptoms and the adoption of the disease model helped to 
secure psychiatry’s reputation as a medical specialty at a time when its professional reputation 
was in question.
4
 This elevation in status continues to give psychiatry—and thus the DSM—
legitimacy, but it also opened the door to an improper dependence on industry. It is the 
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promotion and dissemination of the DSM as a scientifically valid and empirically based 
instrument that fosters acceptance of a disease model of mental disorders.  This view is embraced 
by drug firms and believed by the general public. Although it was not the APA’s or Spitzer’s 
intention to develop a psychiatric manual that was an industry-friendly instrument, Spitzer later 
acknowledged that “[t]he pharmaceuticals were delighted”5 with the model the DSM-III adopted.  
However, it is not only the adoption of the disease model for classifying mental disorders 
that allowed psychiatry’s dependency corruption to develop. Unlike individual—or quid pro 
quo—corruption, which occurs when “bad or bent souls”6 engage in clearly unethical and illegal 
behavior (such as research fraud), dependency corruption results when an organization is no 
longer sufficiently independent to pursue its stated goals or mission effectively. That is, 
systematic practices develop within that institution that are legal, accepted, and normative, but 
that nonetheless undermine its integrity.
7
 Unwittingly, organized psychiatry developed policies, 
financial incentives, and behavioral norms that created an improper dependence on industry—
improper in the sense that the processes for generating knowledge about the etiology and 
treatment of mental illness became compromised. The APA, as an organization, compromised its 
scientific objectivity through a growing dependency on drug firms and by internal interests (such 
as guild interests) and external influences (such as third-party reimbursement practices 
incentivizing psychiatrists to act as psychopharmacologists rather than as talk therapists). 
Practices that allowed for a deviation from organized psychiatry’s public health mission—and 
that also led to a distortion of scientific truths—became normalized. 
For example, in 1980, the year the APA adopted the disease model of mental disorders, it 
also voted to allow pharmaceutical companies to sponsor scientific symposia at its annual 
conference. This not only markedly increased the flow of pharmaceutical money into the APA, it 
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also altered the content of the symposia. The APA’s annual revenues rose from $10.5 million in 
1980
8
 to $65 million in 2008,
9
 by which time at least $14 million came from pharmaceutical 
companies,
10
 in the form of ads in the APA’s journals (American Journal of Psychiatry, 
Psychiatric Times, and Psychiatric Services), sponsorship of scientific symposia at its annual 
conferences, advertising booths at those conferences, and various “educational” grants.  
Another example of the distortion of truths that occurred because of psychiatry’s dependency 
corruption can be seen in the way that the DSM-IV and DSM-5 extend the biopsychosocial 
disease model that began with the DSM-III. Despite the explicit linking of the biological and 
psychological in the DSM-5, there are no biologic markers (i.e., a substance, physiological 
characteristic, gene, etc., that indicates the presence of disease) for any DSM disorder. Allen 
Frances, who chaired the DSM-IV, sums this point up well:  
The incredible recent advances in neuroscience, molecular biology, and brain imaging 
that have taught us so much about normal brain functioning are still not relevant to the 
clinical practicalities of everyday psychiatric diagnosis. The clearest evidence supporting 
this disappointing fact is that not even one biological test is ready for inclusion in the 
criteria sets for DSM-5.
11
  
 
      It is this very disease model and its assumption that mental illness has a clear 
neurochemical etiology that makes the DSM vulnerable to industry capture. In fact, criticisms of 
“disease mongering” emerged as soon as the APA announced proposals for new disorders in the 
DSM-5. Disease mongering refers to (a) the sponsorship of disorders by pharmaceutical 
companies in order to create markets for new drugs and (b) the widening of diagnostic 
boundaries in an effort to expand an existing drug market. Ray Moynihan, Iona Heath, and David 
Henry
12
 described efforts by drug manufacturers to encourage the public to think about diffuse 
symptoms as identifiable and valid diseases or disorders that can be treated with medications, 
thereby creating a risk of overdiagnosis—the diagnosis of a clinical entity in an individual 
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without having met the criteria for that entity—and overtreatment.13 One example is Eli Lilly’s 
rebranding and relicensing of its blockbuster drug Prozac (fluoxetine hydrochloride) as the drug 
Sarafem for the treatment of Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder (PMDD). (The application for a 
new indication for Prozac/Sarafem occurred just as Lilly’s patent on fluoxetine was about to 
expire.
14) Before Sarafem’s approval, a roundtable discussion article was published15 that 
supported both the existence of PMDD as a “distinct clinical entity” and the effectiveness of 
antidepressants as a treatment for it; the roundtable included several doctors, FDA 
representatives, and members of Eli Lilly’s staff.  The majority of DSM-IV panel members for 
PMDD had financial ties to Eli Lilly.  
Researchers and clinicians have questioned the validity of some of the new disorders in 
the DSM-5, such as Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder
16
 and Binge Eating Disorder.
17
 
Perhaps the most controversial revision was the elimination of the bereavement exclusion from 
the diagnostic criteria for a Major Depressive Episode. With this change, individuals who are 
actively grieving a loss are no longer distinguished diagnostically from individuals who 
experience depressive symptoms without such a loss. Some psychiatrists have argued that this 
revision is a step toward diagnostic accuracy, if bereaved depression and clinical depression are 
understood as similar symptomatically if not etiologically.
18
 Others, including the former chair of 
the DSM-IV, Allen Frances,
19
 have made the case that the revision would create a “false positive 
problem” resulting in the overdiagnosis of depression and big opportunities for industry profit.  
In 2007, in an attempt to restore public trust and facilitate the practice of good science, 
the APA published a policy requiring individuals involved in the DSM revision process to 
disclose any relationships to industry within the three calendar years preceding their 
appointment, to be updated annually for the duration of their participation. (The current 
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standards can be read online.
20
) The APA believed that its disclosure policy was robust and 
would restore public trust. Yet, a comparison of DSM-IV and DSM-5 panel members showed 
that despite the increased transparency, commercial ties remained strong; 69 percent of the DSM-
5 task force members reported financial ties to industry, a 21-percent increase over the DSM-IV 
task force. The persistence of these ties despite the APA’s disclosure policy shows that 
transparency and attempts to “manage” financial conflicts of interest cannot prevent the 
appearance, if not the reality, of bias in clinical decision-making. 
Also, three-fourths of the work groups continued to have a majority of members with ties 
to drug firms, and it is noteworthy that, as with the DSM-IV, the most conflicted panels for DSM-
5 were those for which pharmacological treatment is the first-line intervention (that is, the 
recommended course of action). For example, 67 percent of the panel for mood disorders, 83 
percent of the panel for psychotic disorders, and 100 percent of the panel for sleep/wake 
disorders (which now includes “Restless Leg Syndrome”) have ties to the pharmaceutical 
companies that manufacture the medications used to treat these disorders or to companies that 
service the pharmaceutical industry.
21
 The extent of conflicts of interest among these work 
groups reveals how important it is to examine the systemic and institutional practices that allow 
for these conflicts and that reinforce them as normative. Indeed, the implications of APA’s 
dependence on industry and of the economies of influence that sustain this dependency need to 
be made explicit.  
 
Clinical Practice Guidelines, the “Funding Effect,” and Institutional Corruption  
Over 20 years ago, the Institute of Medicine (IOM) disseminated recommendations on Clinical 
Practice Guidelines (CPGs).
22
 The assumption at the time was that the guidelines would be 
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trustworthy because they would be an unbiased, empirically derived set of recommendations. 
They would be useful because they would contain a decision tree or algorithm to guide the busy 
clinician inundated with too much—and sometimes contradictory—information. Thus, CPGs are 
intended to enhance the practice of evidence-based medicine by streamlining health care delivery 
and improving the process and outcomes of patient care. Additionally, insurance companies rely 
heavily on guidelines when deciding which treatments they will pay for and, although there is no 
rule that CPGs must be used, they are seen as an integral part of evidence-based medicine.  
As with diagnostic guidelines, clinical care guidelines in psychiatry are vulnerable to 
industry capture because the absence of biological markers for mental disorders increases clinical 
uncertainty.  Increasingly, CPGs, especially those produced by industry-tied professional groups, 
have been criticized for being essentially marketing tools for drug companies
23
 rather than being 
based on sound evidence. Bias in psychiatry CPGs creates the potential to expose many patients 
to harm from unnecessary treatment or from treatment that is not evidence-based. Because 
partnerships between commercial entities and academe are increasingly the norm, it is necessary 
to examine current practices and policies intended to protect against industry’s capture of clinical 
guidelines. In the section below, we discuss why disclosure is not enough of a safeguard to 
prevent bias in psychiatric guidelines.   
If evidence-based medicine is to have real meaning, it is imperative to critically evaluate 
research results published by individuals or medical specialty groups with commercial ties. 
There is a strong and well-documented connection between funding source and study outcome, 
known as the “funding effect.”24 Researchers who examine the relationship between funding 
source and study outcome have consistently shown that results are favorably biased toward the 
funder.
25
 The problem is so pernicious that some researchers
26
 have called for a moratorium on 
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guidelines produced by specialty groups and the Institute of Medicine’s most recent 
recommendations for guideline development recommended that guideline developers free 
themselves from, rather than simply disclose, financial conflicts of interest.
27
  
Clearly, implementing the IOM’s recommendations are an important step in preventing 
bias.
28
 However, the focus on conflicts of interest may deflect attention from the real problem—
institutional practices. Carl Elliott sums this point up well: 
The difficulty with conflict of interest as a way of framing the problem of industry 
funding is that it directs our attention to individuals…. [T]his way of framing the issues 
makes it sound as if these financial ties are a purely individual problem—that an 
individual has a problem and we need to manage it.
29 
 
Hence, the problem is not quid pro quo corruption involving the individual “bad apple”; the 
problem is the “bad barrel.”30 The conceptual and normative framework of institutional 
corruption sheds light on the fact that the funding effect is not the result of research fraud but 
rather is sustained by practices that are legal and often well-accepted within the professional 
group or organization. Cases of individual researchers engaging in research fraud or 
pharmaceutical companies engaging in illegal activities make headlines, yet it is a mistake to 
focus on individuals or to believe that corporate greed is the problem.
31
 The root of the problem 
is organized psychiatry’s improper dependence on industry, the economies of influence and guild 
interests that sustain this dependence, and the alliances that are formed as a result (such as those 
involving the FDA, APA/DSM panel members, and drug companies).  
For example, pharmaceutical companies’ mission statements give the impression that 
they are fully dedicated to serving the public good. Nevertheless, corporate officers have a 
responsibility to serve their shareholders’ interests and market pressures demand that they 
increase their shareholder value. Thus, the primary aims of drug firms are not always congruent 
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with public health and medical goals; organized psychiatry’s dependence on those firms 
inevitably corrupts the development of diagnostic and clinical guidelines. Addressing this 
dependency corruption is particularly difficult because well-intentioned researchers truly believe 
that their financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies do not influence their decision-
making and interpretation of data. As Darrel Regier, co-chair of the DSM-5 told USA Today in 
response to critics who noted that 90 percent of the authors of three major psychiatry CPGs had 
ties to drug firms: “There’s this assumption that a tie with a company is evidence for bias. But 
these people [APA’s CPG authors] can be objective.”32 Contrary to Regier’s optimistic belief, it 
is unrealistic to expect authors of clinical guidelines to achieve what the rest of us cannot:  to 
remain consistently and completely unbiased in the face of a competing interest (see the article 
by Sunita Sah and Adriane Fugh-Berman in this issue).  
But Regier’s view is not surprising; studies have shown that physicians strongly believe 
that commercial ties do not bias their clinical choices despite substantial research demonstrating 
that they typically do.
33
 There is a wealth of data illustrating how difficult it is for individuals to 
remain neutral or be objective when they have a personal stake in a particular outcome.
34
 And 
that is why financial transparency will never eliminate bias. Partnerships with commercial 
entities such as drug firms foster “pro-industry habits of thought, that are difficult, if not 
impossible, to monitor and manage.”35 A powerful example of this kind of pro-industry habit of 
thought can be seen in a recent study of meta-analyses of hypertensive drugs. There was poor 
concordance between results and conclusions in such meta-analyses when the researchers had 
financial ties to drug firms, but there was good concordance when the researchers had financial 
ties to nonprofit groups.
36
 The discordance between results and conclusions when researchers 
have commercial ties shows how easily interpretations can be manipulated, leading to biased 
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treatment recommendations. As the authors of this study point out, this documented discordance 
shows that the peer review process fails to provide stringent enough safeguards against bias.  
The APA’s most recent practice guideline for major depressive disorder provides another 
example of how commercial ties with drug firms can bias the interpretation of meta-analyses. 
Elsewhere we reported
37
 that two meta-analyses, both of which were published in high-impact 
medical journals and received international media attention, independently concluded that, 
because of a lack of demonstrated efficacy, antidepressant medication should not be the first-line 
intervention for mild to moderate depression.
38
 In 2008, Irving Kirsch et al. concluded:  “Drug-
placebo differences increased as a function of initial severity, rising from virtually no difference 
at moderate levels of initial depression to a relatively small difference for patients with very 
severe depression, reaching conventional criteria for clinical significance only for patients at the 
upper end of the very severely depressed category.”39  In a 2010 patient-level meta-analysis, 
which is even more robust than a group-level one, Fournier et al. found that “[t]rue drug effects 
(an advantage of [antidepressant medications] over placebo) were nonexistent to negligible 
among depressed patients with mild, moderate, and even severe baseline symptoms…. [E]fforts 
should be made to clarify to clinicians and prospective patients that whereas [antidepressant 
medications] can have a substantial effect with more severe depressions, there is little evidence 
to suggest that they produce specific pharmacological benefit for the majority of patients with 
less severe acute depressions.”40  
However, the authors of the APA’s practice guideline for depression interpreted the 
meta-analyses quite differently. They recommend antidepressants as a front-line intervention for 
mild to moderate depression, stating: “Response rates in clinical trials typically range from 50-
75% of patients, with some evidence suggesting greater efficacy relative to placebo in 
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individuals with severe depressive symptoms as compared to those with mild to moderate 
symptoms.”41 This statement and their recommendation of pharmacotherapy obscures and 
misstates the main finding of both reviews of the literature; namely, that antidepressants were 
effective only for the most severely depressed patients and thus should not be the front-line 
recommendation for patients who are mildly or even moderately depressed. Is it a coincidence 
that all of the authors of this guideline had significant financial ties with drug firms and the 
majority served on speakers bureaus for the manufacturers of antidepressants? (Industry insiders 
refer to individuals who participate as speakers as “Key Opinion Leaders” because they are seen 
as important to the marketing of drugs and diseases.)
42 
 
In contrast to the APA’s clinical practice guidelines, guidelines for depression produced 
by independent (versus industry-tied) organizations reached a very different conclusion about the 
harm-benefit ratio of antidepressants. For example, the National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom
43
 and recent Dutch guidelines
44
 for depression 
incorporate these recent meta-analyses to support the explicit recommendation that 
antidepressants should not be the first-line treatment for mild to moderate depression. This 
inconsistency between the APA’s guidelines and the literature on which it is supposedly based 
raises questions about the trustworthiness of guidelines developed by individuals or 
organizations with ties to drug companies.  
 
Transparency’s Iatrogenic Effects  
Although many researchers initially embraced academic-industry partnerships as a practical 
means by which science could advance, especially as government funding of research steadily 
declined, these relationships can undermine credibility and lead to the production and 
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dissemination of biased research. Many researchers believed that increased and mandatory 
transparency of commercial ties would preclude bias and ensure the trustworthiness of research 
studies and clinical guidelines. For example, in response to practices such as ghostwriting, 
overstating efficacy, and underreporting harms, the International Committee of Medical Journal 
Editors developed a set of recommendations for disclosure of authors’ industry ties and for 
enhanced accountability.
45
 In turn, government agencies, institutions, and medical specialty 
groups that produced guidelines developed policies that required transparency of commercial 
ties.  
Unfortunately, Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis
46
 was wrong: sunlight is not always 
the best disinfectant. Disclosure is an insufficient strategy for mitigating bias because bias does 
not result from the concealment of financial ties but from their effects.
47
 Transparency thus 
“shifts the problem from one of ‘secrecy of bias’ to ‘openness of bias.’”48  
The inadequacy of transparency as a solution to psychiatry’s dependency corruption is 
demonstrated by the continued controversies over the validity of diagnostic additions and 
revisions and by questions about the trustworthiness of pharmacotherapy treatment 
recommendations. It is also made evident by the recently published 2013 “Dollars for Docs” list 
of large payments from drug firms to U.S. clinicians. The investigative journalism group 
Propublica released the names of 22 physicians who had earned more than $500,000 from 
pharmaceutical companies since 2009 through speaking fees and consulting. Psychiatrists 
dominate the list; 12 of the 22 were psychiatrists, the top recipient being a psychiatrist who had 
earned over a million dollars.
49 
Moreover, there are often unintended consequences of transparency, and it may 
inadvertently increase bias.
50
 Social psychologists such as George Loewenstein and Jason Dana 
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have demonstrated that when individuals disclose a competing interest, they give even more 
biased advice. Two compelling explanations that have been posited are referred to as discounting 
and moral licensing. In the former, individuals try to make up for the fact that their disclosures 
may cause others to discount or downplay their advice. In the latter, it is as if disclosure frees the 
individual to give even more biased advice because others have been warned (what has been 
referred to as the “caveat emptor” effect51). There is also a signal-to-noise problem when 
researchers and authors list every affiliation—even non-industry ones—so that the reader does 
not know how to evaluate the financial associations being reported. Thus, evidence suggests that 
transparency as a solution to conflict of interest is not only insufficient but may further 
complicate ethical decision-making.      
 
What Do Informed Consent and Evidenced-Based Medicine Mean in an Age of Big 
Pharma? 
Organized psychiatry’s dependency corruption—together with documented industry practices 
such as ghostwriting, the selective reporting of clinical trials, and variability in the reporting of 
harm-related results of randomized clinical trials
52—complicates collaborative decision-making 
between patients and health care providers. Informed consent requires an assessment of the risks 
and benefits of the proposed treatment, knowledge of the alternatives to the proposed treatment, 
and disclosure of information that would affect decision-making. The original developers of 
informed consent practices, however, could not have anticipated the prevalence of collaboration 
between academic organizations and the pharmaceutical industry. How meaningful can informed 
consent be if mental health practitioners themselves are unaware of reliability and validity 
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problems in the DSM and do not receive accurate and complete data on the efficacy and risks of 
psychotropic medications in practice guidelines?   
The conceptual framework of institutional corruption
53
 highlights the myriad ways in 
which medical evidence is corrupted, well before pharmaceutical representatives attempt to 
market medications to physicians. Specifically, (a) the failings of the peer-review process to 
adequately protect against ghostwriting and (b) the documented discordance between results and 
conclusions (such that the conclusions support the sponsoring company’s drug, even if the results 
do not) make it difficult for the prescriber to be adequately informed about the evidence base for 
new drugs.  This, in turn, undermines genuine informed consent and collaborative decision-
making. There have been glaring examples of iatrogenic harm caused by the distortion of 
important information about a drug’s adverse side effects.54  
In light of the corruption of the evidence upon which clinical decision-making is based, 
informed consent can no longer be seen as a scripted and static event, achieved by a simple 
listing of currently known risks, benefits, and alternatives. Rather, we need a dynamic model of 
informed consent.
55
 It should be a conversation that occurs over time,
56
 encouraging both doctors 
and patients to think critically about the scientific evidence. Patients and clinicians should be 
made aware of the dependency corruption that results from academic-industry relationships and 
the economies of influence—such as the APA’s guild interests and the alliance among the FDA, 
drug companies, and organized psychiatry—that sustain this corruption.  
Patients and doctors need to know that only 11 to 14 percent of all new drugs approved 
by the FDA show a clinically relevant benefit over existing treatments
57
 and that the percentage 
of drugs showing no significant improvement has increased in the last decade, as has the 
percentage of drugs with a negative harm/benefit ratio (more harm than benefit).
58
 Patients and 
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doctors should also know that pharmaceutical companies fund most of the research on the 
efficacy and safety of new medications and that these studies can only assess a medication’s 
short-term effects, both positive and negative.   
Additionally, mental health clinicians need to take a critical approach to contemporary 
models of psychiatric taxonomy and treatment. Professional training usually teaches the clinician 
to learn new content, such as new the diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5 or the benefits of a new 
antidepressant. But because pharmaceutical companies provide substantial financial support for 
continuing medical education (CME)
59 
sometimes underwriting it entirely—CME has become 
compromised by another corrupting economy of influence. The idea of evidence-based medicine 
and informed consent are compromised when the peer-review process fails to provide enough of 
a safeguard against systemic practices that favor commercial interests (such as the use of 
secondary endpoints to generate a positive result of drug over placebo).  
Not only should dependence on industry funding of CMEs be eliminated, but critical 
thinking and de-biasing strategies should be a required part of postgraduate medical training. 
Instead of focusing only on content-related issues, CME should include courses and activities 
that review the empirical literature on the funding effect and its implications for assessing the 
trustworthiness of diagnostic and clinical guidelines. Mental health clinicians need CME that 
helps them critically evaluate research on the efficacy and safety of psychotropic medications. 
For example, reporting response rates (or a decrease in symptoms that are statistically significant 
but not clinically meaningful) rather than statistics on remission in randomized controlled trials 
for antidepressants artificially inflates the benefits of antidepressant medication. Insofar as all 
medical decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty,
60
 informed consent practices will be 
enhanced by training practices that strengthen the decision-making process.  
17 
 
 
Conclusion 
Shifting the focus from an individual model of quid pro quo corruption to the conceptual 
framework of institutional corruption reveals the systemic nature of psychiatry’s “crisis of 
credibility.” Addressing this crisis has epistemic, ethical, and public health implications. The 
distortion of the science underlying psychiatric diagnostic and treatment guidelines can result in 
significant social injury (that is, overdiagnosis and overtreatment).  If “evidence-based medicine” 
is to have genuine meaning in organized psychiatry, calls for disclosing or managing individuals’ 
financial conflicts of interest must be recognized as ineffective and potentially harmful.  It is 
dependency corruption that undermines evidence-based medicine and informed consent and 
normalizes the promotion of industry interests.    
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